THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE IN THE
CONTEXT OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION: THE ANDEAN
AGREEMENT MODEL

I.

INTRODUCTION

Latin America is indubitably experiencing a new wave of economic nationalism. This has been reflected most poignantly in
recent free trade and economic integration efforts as well as the
more dramatic actions such as expropriations and nationalizations
of American subsidiaries in Chile and Peru. The ramifications of this
modern era of economic independence is of pressing importance to
foreign investors. Therefore, an examination of the multinational
enterprise in the context of recent economic integration efforts is
crucial to an understanding of the foreign investor's future in Latin
America. There have been a legion of integration efforts, the most
notable being: the Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA), the Central American Common Market (CACM), the
Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA), and most recently,
the Andean Subregional Integration Agreement (also known as the
Cartagena Agreement, the Andean Group, Andean Agreement,
Andean Common Market and AnCom).1 Because the Andean
Agreement is the most recent, the most comprehensive, and holds
the greatest potential, (in that it appears to surmount many of the
blunders made by earlier economic integration efforts), it can be
considered a model integration agreement which, if successful, will
be repeated in the future by other lesser developed nations.
This study endeavors to discuss in a broadly circumscribed manner: I. What may be considered the three major goals of the
Agreement and how those goals will be realized within the rules
of the Agreement; II. The repercussions of those rules on U.S.
investors' decisions on whether to invest in the face of such controls on foreign investment; and Ill. A prognosis and some sugges1. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration May 26, 1969.
INT'L LEGAL MATERmALS 910 [hereinafter referred to as Agreement].
November 1973Vol. i No. I
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tions for harmonizing economic independence with the growth of
multinational investment.
An initial caveat must be sounded however. The Andean nations' economic problems are not necessarily indicative of all Latin
American nations. An analysis of the multinational enterprise in
regard to Andean economic issues will not serve as a panacea for
all of South America. The study of the multinational enterprise
within this particular agreement then, will clearly not serve as an
economic crystal ball. Neither is this discussion devoted to an exhaustive study of the nuances of the Andean Agreement. Two
central issues will be addressed in this article. First, how does the
Andean Agreement seek to ameliorate Latin American 'economic
development? Second, will the controls on foreign investment as
embodied in the Agreement prove too rigid and thus result in the
dissipation of foreign investment in Andean nations? A brief overview of the Andean Agreement is therefore germane at this point.
The initial Andean Agreement of 1969 consisted of Chile, Peru,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia, although in early 1973 Venezuela
also became a member. 2 The Agreement states as its goals the
promotion of
a balanced and harmonious development of the Member States,
to accelerate this development through economic integration ...
designed to secure the progressive improvement
of the living
standards of the people of the Subregion.3
an equitable distribution of the benefits resulting from integration of Member States by effecting a reduction of the existing discriminations that aggravate them . .. taking into account
...expansion of global exports of each State, [the] conduct of
the trade balance with respect to the Subregion, the development

of [the] gross territorial product, the generation of new employ-

ment, and ... capital formation. 4

To realize these somewhat abstract goals the Agreement plans for
coordination of economic and social policies, intensified subregional
industrialization, a common tariff, stimulation of the agricultural
and livestock sector, and investment financing. 5
In 1971 a dynamic and cogent Investment Code6 was added as well
2. N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1973, at 9, col. 1. One author attributed Venezuela's delay in joining to the fear that there would be a 'major national
disaster if Venezuelan borders were to be opened to the 'cheap labour'
products of neighboring countries." Wionczek, The Rise and the Decline
of Latin American Economic Integration, 9 J. or ColvmmoN MA= S=niss 49, 61 (1972).
3. Agreement, supranote 1, Art. 1.
4. Id., Art. 2.
5. Id., Art. 3 (a,b,d,e,f).
6. Andean Foreign Investment Code July 17, 1971. 11 Iir'L LEGrAL
MAERsiALs 126 [hereinafter cited as Investment Code].
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as a Code on Multinational Enterprises And The Regulations
With Regard To Subregional Capital.7 But it is the new Investment
Code that actually carries the major economic impact, and it is the
Investment Code with which foreign investors are primarily concerned. The Code provides for, inter alia, prior restraints on the
entry of direct new investment; 8 control over technological transfer
and patent and trademark restrictions; 9 regulation of remittance

of profits to foreign parent corporation; 10 total restriction on foreign investment in certain sectors;" and, most importantly, divestiture of foreign controlled subsidiaries down to 49% foreign control within fifteen years of the date of the Code. (20 years for
corporations in Ecuador and Brazil.) 1 2 The latter article provides
the major thrust of the Investment Code in that it endeavors to
transmute foreign controlled corporations into local corporations.
The Code even sets up a divestiture timetable or "fade-out" formula which calls for local control of multinational subsidiaries at
the following rates: 15% local control within three years, 45%
local control within 10 years, and 51% local control within 15 years.' 3
This in no way outlaws foreign subsidiaries that will hold
greater than 49% of the control. All this means is that corporations holding greater than 49% control will not be allowed to share
in the advantages of the regional trade agreement, e.g. elimination
of tariffs. 1 4 In reality however, this means that a multinational
corporation will have to comply with divestiture rules if it is to
survive in Andean nations. This is because complying corporations will be able to vastly undercut prices vis-a-vis non-complying
corporations due to the advantages they will have under reduced
tariffs. Hence one may assume that, under the Code, multinational enterprises realistically have only two alternatives: comply
7. Andean Code on Multinational Enterprises and the Regulations
With Regard to Subregional Capital, December 9-18, 1971. 11 INVL
LEGAL MATmA's 357 [hereinafter cited as MNE Code].
8. Investment Code, supra note 6, Art. 2.
9. Id., Art. 20, 25, 26.
10. Id., Arts. 7-11, 21, 37.

11. Id., Art. 41, 42, 43.
12. Id., Art. 28, 30.

13. Id. Control is not only determined by financial holdings but by
"technical, administrative, financial and commercial management of the
enterprise" as well. MNE Code, supra note 7, Art. 10.
14, Investment Code, supranote 6, Art. 27.

with divestiture timetables or withdraw from Andean investment
entirely.
These restrictions and regulations allegedly will provide a basis
for economic growth of the Andean nations. This growth and integration will eventually combine with the Latin American Free
Trade Association for a more pervasive Latin American integration.1 In the interim however, the Agreement seeks to strengthen
Andean economies by encouraging foreign investment while simultaneously harnessing and directing such investment toward
more nationalistic goals. All too often the goals of multinational
investors run counter to domestic desires. Latin Americans are
well aware of this and thus are often distrustful of U.S. investments. Since the events of the past mold current attitudes, a brief
history of U.S. investments in South America will yield a reason
for their distrust.
One may start by noting that such suspicion rests on a solid
historical foundation. United States' economic and political policies have been grounded in the view that the South American region is merely a fertile producer of raw materials for exportation.
"The economic interests of the United States lay principally in
promoting private investment and enterprise and serving the business interests of its citizens in the area."' 6 U.S. history of foreign
policy may be summarized as one of political and military muscle
17
against foreign governments to further U.S. business interests.
This is not to say however, that American foreign investment in
Latin America has been completely devoid of any positive impact
on the "host" country. As will be discussed in greater detail later,
foreign investment has brought new capital, has diffused technology to the host country, and has paid higher wages and offered
better social services to employees than have many local entrepreneurs.
In the past, the multinational enterprise did not take on the overbearing posture it assumes today. It was 'essentially national in
15. Agreement, supranote 1, Art. 110.
16. J. GRUI'EWALD,
IN-EGRATION AND U.S.

M.

WixoczEK, M.

CAmOY, LATN AwmCAW EcoNOrMm

PorcY (Brookings Institute, 1972) at 65.

17. Alejandro, Direct Foreign Investment in Latin America (in C. KNNAL CORpORAT N, M.I.T. Press 1970), at 320.
To more acutely emphasize the point a U.S. Marine General once stated:
"I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank
boys to collect revenues in. I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers ... I helped make Honduras
'right' for American fruit companies. Looking back on it, I might have
given Al Capone a few hints." GuNm , INsmE SouTH AmERcA, (Pocket
Books 1968) at 161.

PLrBERGER, THE IxTEmNAT
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nature with only minor subsidiaries in foreign countries. But in
this century, the growth of multinational subsidiaries has been
astounding.' 8 In view of such expansion there is no denying that
"international business is now the dominant factor in determining
changes in the pattern of world exports as well as capital flows." 19
What this means in the eyes of Latin Americans is that their economies are puppets on the strings of foreign investment decisions.
Perhaps Raymond Vernon sums it up best.
Practically all countries that harbor the subsidiaries of multinational enterprises suffer from a sense of dependence, a sense that
is nurtured by the assumption that these enterprises may have
extensive geographical options and that the exercise of these options could easily affect the local economy ... this sense is especially acute in the less developed countries because of their
relative size and their relative reliance on foreign controlled raw
material exporters. The history of raw material exploitation, as
is well known,
is filled with cases in which those options were
20

exercised.

So it is not surprising to find in Latin Americans today, an apprehension that their entire economy, indeed their very sovereignty
hinges on the whim and caprice of foreign investment policies.
Possibly even more frightening to Latin Americans is the fear that
past economic control presages ultimate foreign political domination and cultural disintegration. Obviously, the objectives of the
multinational corporation and -the foreign investor generally are
not seen as compatible with the goals of the nation state. The decisions of local subsidiaries are made by parent corporations in
other countries. These decisions often take little or no account of
the national goals, desires or idiosyncrasies of the host nation.
"Few persons, or nations, like to put their well being in the hands
of others. Governments are not happy that decisions affecting the
welfare of their nationals and affecting their own national policies
21
can be made by foreign corporations.1
18. For example, out of a group of 187 American parent corporations
whose holdings account for 80% of U.S. foreign investment (outside Canada), there were 250 subsidiaries by the end of World War I, 500 by 1929,
1,000 by 1945, 2,000 by 1957 and over 5,500 by 1967. Rubin, Multinational
Enterprise and National Sovereignty: A Skeptic's Analysis, 3
POLICY IN INT. BUS. 1, 2 (1971).

19. Id.
20.

VER ON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY

21. Rubin, supranote 18, at 9.

(Basic Books Inc. 1971) at 181.

LAW AND

Yet while Latin Americans are suspicious of multinational enterprises they realize that their economies are simply too unstable
to survive without them. The problem is theoretically simpleeconomic development depends on capital; foreign investment supplies necessary capital; therefore, without foreign investment there
can be no development. This has fostered a schizophrenic "lovehate" relationship with foreign investment. There is a love of such
investment because it brings in the missing elements of production
such as capital, entrepreneurship, technology, and financial backing. The hate element arises from a realization that multinational
corporations often stifle local development and force too much reliance on investment from -abroad, thus placing Andean nations
in the precarious position of seeking to assert economic independence and yet not at the cost of driving off too much foreign investment. Too dramatic a response to foreign investments, such as
outright expropriations, is certain to scare off foreign investment.
A more subtle, yet cogent step is economic integration. 22 Within
the Andean model for economic integration both the goals of the
multinational corporation and the goals of the host country can be
achieved with a modicum of friction. The multinational corporation, while it may lose some profits in the short run, will gain the
stability of a predictable business environment in the long run.
This is because policies will be harmonized among the Andean nations so that multinationals will be able to function in a more
mobile and efficient manner.
The integration effort is thus an assertion of national sovereignty-an attempt to extricate the Andean nations from the economic grip of foreign parent corporations. "What AnCon basically has done is to dramatize the distrust many countries have
of foreign investment and codify these misgivings to shape the
ownership patterns and business practices of companies that wish
to profit from the benefits of the market.123 Yet in this effort
the common market must maintain the very delicate balance of
maximizing economic independence while simultaneously maximizing the attractiveness of Latin America to multinational investors.
22. In fact, it is felt that the Andean Agreement "was prepared as an
alternative to the outright taking of alien's interests by the host state."

Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code; A New Phase in the Quest
for Normative Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 66 Am. J. INT'L
LAw 763, 779 (1972).
23. Diaz, The Andean Common Market: Challenge to Foreign Investors,
6 CoLum.SiA J. WoRw Bus. No. 4, 22, 23 (1971).
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I.

ANDEAN INTEGRATION MEANS

AND ENDs

In light of the foregoing discussion it should be clear that Latin
America is not directly inimical to foreign investment. The Investment Code states that "the contribution of foreign capital and
technology may perform an important role in subregional development." 24 It is understood then, that foreign investment in the
context of multinational corporations is a powerful force for economic growth. But currently it is a force that needs harnessing
and direction toward more nationalistic goals. (And with Latin
America's shortage of competent economists the task is even more
formidable.) 25 The Andean Agreement seeks to funnel foreign
investment towards three primary goals. 1) Technological growth
-and amelioration of employment skills. 2) Expanding and coordinating markets. 3) Equitable allocation of industries and benefits. It must be noted that these three goals are by no means a
summary of Andean economic problem areas. They are simply the
three major areas of concern within the Andean Agreement. And
it must be remembered that the Agreement does not purport to be
a panacea.
Technology and Labor Skills
Leading economists agree that "the multinational enterprise has
proven to be an especially proficient vehicle for developing, transferring, and using complex technology.

'2 6

This technology, which

is currently being diffused at a vigorous pace, is not only a major
source of research and expertise for the host country but also aids
in the training of local personnel. In this sense foreign technology
has a didactic function in that it raises the mean competence of local labor. This means that with the multinational corporation
comes a concomitant injection of new labor skills as well as a general modernization of the entire productive structure. Not only
that, but as indicated earlier, in spite of charges of exploiting
"cheap labor" in under-developed countries, many multinationals
24. Investment Code, supranote 6, Declaration, par. 2.
25. Alejandro, supra note 17, at 328.
26. Stobaugh, The Multinational Corporation: Measuring the Consequences, 6 COLuMBIA J. WORLD Bus. No. 1, 59, 61 (1971). To further sup-

port this point see Jantsch, The 'World Corporation': The Total Commit-

ment, 6 COLuMBIA J. WORLD Bus. No. 3, 5, 8 (1971).

have paid higher wages and provided better social services than
local employers.27 Additionally, they employ substantial numbers
of nationals that otherwise might well be unemployed. 28 Therefore, since technology breeds skilled labor and productive efficiency, it is not surprising to see a great concern on the part of
the Andean nations to a) encourage and capture existing foreign
technology, and b) foster development of local technological resources. Towards these goals the Andean Agreement has clearly
29
addressed itself.
The Agreement has delineated a policy dedicated to forcing multinational enterprises to transfer technological advances into the
hands of local entrepreneurs and to use imported technology for
greater expansion, specialization and diversification of industrial
production."0 It hopes also to "contribute to the generation of
employment in the Subregion.131 What the Andean Agreement
has sought to do, in the words of its technological studies director
Constantine Vaitsos, is "to bring commercial bargaining into technology transfer, just like any other product.132 To further encourage technological growth the Agreement has proposed inter
alia, joint programs of research and development, 33 as well as "national research and development centers."3 4
Unfortunately, although countries have had rules in the past
regarding multinational holdings it was "generally possible,
through straw men, options and other devices, to avoid their impact."35 For this reason the Investment Code has severely cracked
down on what had amounted to anti-trust activity in the past in
the fields of licenses, trademarks, etc. For example, foreign parent
corporations often entered into agreements with host countries in
which the host country agreed not to compete in certain areas of
technological study. Such agreements are now prohibited under
the Investment Code.3 6 Likewise prohibited are special purchase
27. Benoit, The Attack on the Multinationals, 7
Bus. No. 6, 15, 17-18 (1972).

CoLu-MBA J.

WoRLD

28. In the less-developed nations U.S. subsidiaries employ over three

million domestic personnel. Vernon, supra note 20, at 171.
29. Agreement, supra note 1, Art. 38.
30. Id., Art. 32 (a,c).
31. MNE Code, supra note 7, Art. 7(j).
32. Wall St. J., May 21, 1973 at 6, col. 1.
33. MNE Code, supra note 7, 8 (e) (4); and Agreement, supra note 1, Art.

37 (e).

34. Investment Code, supra note 6, Art. 23 (c).
35. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739, 742-43 (1970).
36. Investment Code, supra note 6, Art. 20 (d).
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options in favor of the supplier of the technology as well as any
agreement that restricts the export of a licensed product. 37 This
obviously means more freedom of exportation of Andean goods.
The Code also provides for special tax and other benefits to be
38
granted to investments which involve local technology.
Perhaps most striking of all is the broad power allocated to the
Control Office. Not only must all technical assistance agreements
be registered with the Control Office but they must be approved by
such office as well.39 And to prevent the multinational enterprise
from encroaching upon certain areas the Commission 0 may prohibit certain products or product groups to be patentable in member countries. 41
In summary then, the Andean Agreement has sought to ameliorate the labor situation through diffusion of foreign technology.
It has regulated foreign technology in hopes of not only stimulating local technology, but also in hopes of freeing products produced by foreign technology from restrictive agreements which
42
have traditionally encumbered the export of those goods.
Expanding Markets and Market Control
Resolving problems of technological advance and improving labor skills will prove fruitless if other facets of the economy are
not also improved. "Nations that to a considerable extent still
compete in raw material production will have little to trade with
'43
one another until their industrialization reaches higher levels.
Therefore, integration efforts endeavor eventually to have industrialization replace import-oriented economies of the Andean na37. Id., Art. 20, 25.
38. Id., Art. 23.
39. Id., Art. 6 (f).

40. Agreement, supra note 1, Art. 6. See generally Chapter II, Organs
of the Agreement.
41. Investment Code, supra note 6, Art. 26.
42. The purpose of this is ostensibly to push foreign investment out of
certain fields and hopefully to direct foreign investment towards the
higher risk ventures, leaving certain "secure" product group production in
the hands of local companies.
It is also noteworthy that the United Nations Committee on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), has encouraged the more advanced nations to
facilitate the flow of capital and technology to less-developed nations.
43. GaUtNEwAwL,

WioNczEK, CARNOY, supra note 16, at 29.

tions.4 4 But industrial growth, as a substitute for importation,
is dependent upon the increase in national markets. If industrialization is dependent on expansion of markets then it is not surprising to find that enlargement of markets and protected trade in a
4
common market is a major goal of the Andean Agreement. " Furthermore, since locally manufactured goods cannot compete in the
markets, of more advanced countries, (since the technology, capital,
and entrepreneurial know-how in such economies far exceed that
found in Latin American economies), the Andean nations must
as major marketwork toward developing their own economies
4
places for Andean manufactured goods. 6
Obviously, one of the fastest routes to an enlarged market is
economic integration. The reduction of trade barriers will, hopefully, not only stimulate inter-regional trade but will make Andean
nations an attractive region for foreign investment. The profits
and growth that could be realized are enticing. For example, one
study prepared for LAFTA indicated that the annual benefits of
producing 14 products regionally as opposed to importing them
from the United States is estimated to range from $180 million to
$230 million (depending on transportation costs and rates of exchange) .47

Historically however, Latin American production has not been
geared toward integration but rather toward exportation of raw
materials. This is because transportation and trade mechanisms
were designed by foreigners interested primarily in raw material
exportation. Consequently, there has been little inter-regional
trade and no regional industrial policy. This must be altered if
the Andean Group is to expand and develop industrially. In response to these problems AnCom has set up a program to organize
"a common trade policy with respect to third countries."48 This
44. Andean economies are often deemed "export-oriented" because they
derive what wealth they have from exportation of raw materials. However, when this author uses the term "import-oriented" to describe Andean economies it is in reference to the fact that most all of the more
refined industrialized goods are imported from abroad.
45. Not only is it hoped that markets can be expanded but it is felt
that with greater inter-regional trade will come a stimulation of sectors
such as communications, transportation (notably seaports, riverports, highways, railroads, and airports), and such social projects as schools, hospitals and housing.
46. "Such a regionwide market might appear more durable to the Latin
American business community than would markets opened up through
special trade preferences in developed countries. The permanence of developed countries' concessions would always be uncertain .... " GRuEwALD, WxoxczEK, CARNoY, supra note 16, at 28.
47. Id., at 34.
48. Agreement, supra note 1, Art. 26 (e).
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includes tariff and trade agreements covering 175 items4 9 as well
as an elimination of trade barriers on products not yet produced.50
But the Agreement seeks not only to expand markets by preferenial trade arrangements, but also to direct multinational investments into selected production sectors. The Code on Multinational Enterprises provides that multinational corporations should
"contribute to the strengthening of subregional entrepreneurial capacity in order to take fuller advantage of the expanded market
... facilitate access to international capital markets ...
[and]
strengthen the Subregion's capacity to compete in the markets of
third countries." 51 Furthermore, in an effort to align foreign investment with national goals the Multinational Enterprise Code requires that the multinational corporation must be of "subregional
interest". 52 The Agreement also closes off foreign investment entirely from certain "sensitive areas" such as public services, insurance, commercial banks and financing institutions, internal transportation, and publicity (e.g. radio).53 This is apparently an attempt to prod foreign investment towards solving "problems that
unfavorably affect the process of subregional integration." 54
Thus we can see within the Agreement a two-pronged approach;
the first approach is to open new markets and expand existing
ones, and the second, to direct foreign investment towards sectors
of production that are most beneficial to Andean national interest.
What will hopefully transpire out of such an approach is a lowering of manufacturing costs (since capital goods may be acquired
more cheaply through inter-regional trade), increased investments
(since multinationals will want to take advantage of the tariff reductions-if they will take the disadvantage of divestiture along
with it), and finally, more beneficial and efficient allocation of
resources within the region.
DistributingBenefits
If the Andean Agreement endeavors to metamorphose economies
from import orientation of sophisticated goods to export orienta49. 22 INT'L F

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

ANxcLL NEWS SURVEY 143 (1971).

Id.

MNE Code, supra note 7, Art. 7 (c,k,1).
Id., Art. 8 (e).
Investment Code, supra note 6, Art. 41, 42,43.

MNE Code, supra note 7, Art. 8 (e).

tion; to expand markets; and to direct multinational investment
into selected productive sectors, then it raises the additional problem of allocating the benefits among member nations. This problem entails two competing concepts--efficiency and equity. The
Agreement stresses the benefits to be gained by greater efficiency
-an ability both to lower the costs of goods internally in the region and to make the products more competitive internationally.
It also emphasizes "an equitable balancing of the benefits among
the participating countries---'reciprocity'--so that the more rapid
growth of the advanced countries in the region is not at the expense of the less developed ones." 55 On the one hand then, the
Andean Agreement seeks to maximize gain to the union as a whole,
but on the other it must insure that industrial allocation is distributed in a fair manner so as to avoid the dissension among the
economically weaker nations that has plagued LAFTA. In LAFTA
the smaller nations have complained that inter-regional trade has
not led to sufficient reciprocity of benefits and in fact the smaller
nations are essentially subsidizing the industrialization of the
stronger powers. For example, Argentina, Mexico and Brazil, who
have an aggregate of 80% of the regional industrial production
doubled their favorable trade balance between 1962-1966. The middle powers, with 17% of LAFTA's regional industrial production
doubled their trade deficit. The smaller nations, with 3% of regional industrial production have now become severe "regional
debtors".56
Realizing the failings of LAFTA in this area the Andean Agreement has evinced, albeit in rather broadly couched terms, a genuine appreciation of the problem. The Agreement states as one
of its objectives "[a] balanced and harmonious development
[which] must be conducive to an equitable distribution of the benefits resulting from integration of the Member States.157 But no
satisfactory "game plan" can be devised at the outset of the Agreement nor even now, three years later. The answer to the problem
is inextricably bound with the national idiosyncratic needs of each
nation and the changing conditions of the times. However, certain
industries have already been scheduled for a country by country
allocation. Those industries include drugs, steel, autos, glass, fertilizers and petrochemicals. 58
55. Behrman, Is There a Better Way for Latin America?, 6 COLUVIBA
J. WoRLD Bus. No. 6, 61, 65 (1971).
56. Ereli, The Andean Common Market, 8 HousToN L. REv. 487, 488

(1971).

57. Agreement, supra.note 1, Art. 2.
58. Wall St. J., supra note 32.
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At least one major inequity among member nations however, is
evident at present. This is the gross disparity between the economic strength of Ecuador and Bolivia as compared to the remaining member nations. The economies of Bolivia and Ecuador are
substantially weaker than the economies of other Andean nations.
In fact, with the exception of Paraguay, Ecuador and Bolivia have
the smallest GNP's in all of South America. 59 Taking into account
the fact that these two nations are sorely without the tools for
rapid industrial growth (such as skilled labor, technology, management and capital), the Agreement has allowed for preferential
treatment of Bolivia and Ecuador. The chapter of the Agreement
on "Objectives and Operation" specifically states that [p]referential treatment [is] to be accorded Bolivia and Ecuador. ' 60 The
Agreement further calls for the "progressive elimination of differences existing in the development of the Subregion" and in striving
for such Ecuador and Bolivia will enjoy special treatment "to permit them to achieve a more accelerated rate of 'economic growth,
through effective and immediate participation in the advantages
of area industrialization and liberalization of trade."'6 1 To heighten
this acceleration the Investment Code allows multinationals 20 years
to divest down to the 49% level as opposed to 15 years in other
member nations.62 The reason for giving Ecuador and Bolivia
greater time to divest themselves of multinational control is because the existing structure of those economies are simply too
heavily dependent on multinational control to survive without it.
In short, too rapid divestment of foreign corporations would place
too substantial a burden on local production facilities in these
weak economies.
The Andean Agreement, unlike LAFTA's failure, addresses itself
directly to allocation of benefits flowing from participation in the
subregion. "The specific programs to be suggested by the Conmission, will not only determine the applicable liberalization and
common external tariff, but more important, will allocate the products subject to the program among the various members, with priority to Bolivia and Ecuador, and determine the means to assure
59.

GRuNEWALD, WIoNcZEK, CARNoy, supra note

60. Agreement, supranote 1, Art. 3 (h).
61. Id., Art. 91.
62. Investment Code, supranote 6, Art. 28, 30.

16, at 22.

that allocation will be complied with. ' S
Summary
The foregoing discussion of three areas of concern within the
Andean Integration Agreement should illustrate that regional integration would permit Andean nations to enter the more sophisticated areas of manufacturing as well as permitting Andean nations
to gradually take part in the world trading community. The
Agreement hopes to achieve this via close controls on technology,
a preference for local technology, prohibition of foreign investment in certain sectors of production, reduction of tariffs, allocation of foreign investment to meet more nationalistic economic
goals and an equitable distribution of industries and benefits
among member nations. If integration efforts arose out of fears by
Latin Americans of "the possibility that their economies will be
dominated by single firms, that there will be price-controlled conspiracies, [and] that new technology will be bottled up,"' 64 then the
response to these fears is engendered in the Agreement's attempt to
direct multinational enterprises toward national economic independence goals.
There is always the danger however, that such attempts at economic independence as embodied in the Andean Agreement will
be anathema to the multinational corporation. The foreboding
fear now is whether foreign investors will be so disconcerted over
new divestiture rules and other regulations that they will withdraw investment from Latin America entirely. It does seem clear
that at least some investment will be withheld initially. The multinationals will probably slow down investment in order to give
them time to size up the impact of the integration effort before
initiating new investments. Therefore, economic independence will
not come without a price. But the long-run benefits for Andean
nations will probably far exceed the short-run costs. There are
those however, who would disagree with the last statement and
claim that the Agreement "will result in the stagnation of the industrial development process and of economic growth." 65 Whether
foreign investors will decide to withdraw or remain in Andean nations is the dilemma analyzed in the following section.
63. Ereli, supra note 56, at 494.
64. Rogers, United States Investment in Latin America: A Critical Approach, 11 VA. J. INT'L LAW 246, 254 (1971).
65. Petersen, ANCOM: An Andean Paradox,6 CoLumBTA J. Woujp Bus.
No. 4, 29, 33 (1971).
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Ill.

THE M

LTINATIONAL

ENTERPRISE'S DhMnFMA:

DnmSTmENT OR INVESTMMT
The new stringent controls on foreign investments have brought
about a growing apprehension on the part of multinational corporations over their enterprises in Latin America. 66 In addition,
there seems no indication that economic independence efforts are
likely to subside in the future0 7 The issue then, is whether foreign investment will remain in the Anden nations in the face of
the controls discussed in the preceding section. The net effect of
those rules might be to divert investment away from Andean nations. Some negative reactions to the Agreement have been
strongly voiced. Senator Jacob Javits of New York has stated:
The Code, as it is presently drawn could prove detrimental to the
economic interests of these nations by making more difficult the
securing of sources of outside capital financing-particularly for
68
major new projects requiring major capital financing.

Representatives of the Chase Manhattan Bank have stated that the
Agreement appears "certain to curtail the flow of new foreign private investment to the Andean area. Accordingly, chronic shortages of local capital and foreign exchange will be further aggravated. ' 69 The U.S. Commerce Department has issued a statement
noting that "foreign capital will not go where it is not wanted.
If a nation wants to attract foreign capital, it must establish clear
ground rules, and build a business climate in which the investor
can have confidence." 70
One might thus conclude that multinationals feel that the years
of profitable Latin American investment are coming to an end and
that the wisest policy for the future should be total divestment.
But the more enlightened view holds that foreign investment will
remain in the Andean nations and in fact that the multinational
enterprise can mature simultaneously with Andean economic in71
dependence.
66. See infra notes 68, 69, 70.

67. In fact, the Investment Code provides that each nation may put
even further regulations on multinational enterprises. Investment Code,
supra note 6, Art. 40, par. 5. The only thing the multinational corporation
can be assured of is that it will never receive more favorable treatment
than a local corporation. Investment Code, supra note 6, Art. 50.
68. J. ComMERcE AWD ComvMEcAL, Feb. 11, 1971 at 4.
69. Id.
70. Id.

71. One author contends that total divestment in Latin America would

The first, and probably primary reason why total divestment
by multinationals will probably not occur in Andean nations (and
Latin America generally) is that in spite of economic independence
efforts, Andean investment can remain profitable. In spite of the
agonizing and lamenting over the new restrictions on foreign investment, businessmen still realize the importance of these developing countries not only as a prime source of essential raw materials but also as an integral part of the growing global market.
To illustrate the importance of Andean nations it is noteworthy
that the 1969 figures indicate that the combined GNP of AnCom
72
nations was 31 billion dollars, and is growing.
Likewise, the population is growing and to withdraw from this
expanding population is to sacrifice an immense marketplace for
goods produced through Andean subsidiaries. In the period from
1957-1966 for example, exports by U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries
grew sevenfold.7 3 In light of such growth and potential even if
multinationals meet the 51% divestiture requirement there still appears much room for profit with 49% ownership in the subsidiaries, for one must remember that the Agreement does not limit
profits per se. In fact, the Agreement hopes to assure investors
of continued profits within the common market. To ease the pain
of divestment, the "fadeout" or divestiture timetable guarantees
repatriation of the originally invested capital to the foreign multinationals.
A second factor militating in favor of continuing investment in
Andean nations is the fact that current investments are too pervasive to relinquish. In other words, multinational enterprises have
already invested too much to give up the ship now.
Looking at the statistics regarding investment in Latin America
one finds that the abandonment or rechanneling of such investment is a highly dubious proposition. For example, U.S. investments rose from $8.3 billion in 1960 to $13.8 billion in 1969. This
has left the United States with a favorable trade balance of over
be a major blessing to Latin American economic growth. See generally,
Hirschman, How to Divest in Latin America and Why, PRINCETON ESSAYS
In INTERNATIONAL FINANCE No. 76, November, 1969. In his analysis A/fr.

Hirschman posits the theory that after a certain stage of economic development large amounts of foreign investment have a retardant effect
on the economy. Assuming arguendo that this theory is plausible, it is
still doubtful that many Andean nations have reached such a stage of
economic development. But cf. Linowitz, Why Invest In Latin America?, 49
HARV. Bus. REv. January-February 1971, 120.
72. Diaz, supra note 23, at 25-26.
73. Linowitz, supra note 71, at 128.
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$600 million.7 4 U.S. direct investment in the Andean nations (excluding Venezuela) exceeds 2.4 billion dollars.7 5 Finally, to totally
divest in Andean nations would mean to divest in a region that accounts for 90% of Latin America's copper; 50% of Latin America's
coal; 65% of Latin America's iron ore; and 86% of crude oil.7 6
It seems apparent that for reasons of self-interest the current
investments in the Andean nations are too substantial to abandon.
The more propitious policy would be for foreign investors to bear
with the present economic independence efforts rather than "abandon the field simply because of a desire to do business as they
7
have done in the past.1
Thirdly, investment should continue in Andean nations because
there is nothing in the Agreement goals that is inherently in conflict with the goals of the multinational enterprise. While it is
true that when there is a corporation that is multinational in outlook and a country that is nationalistic in outlook, a certain degree
of conflict is inevitable. Nonetheless, multinationals are essentially seeking the same goals as the Andean nations. Those goals
have been defined as production efficiency, expansion of markets,
and stability of the economy. While multinationals consider immediate profits a prime goal "[t] hey would not even have to see
larger profits in the offing, for they would be happy with the
greater certainty afforded in a stable economic environment."78 1
Not only are multinationals seeking similar goals as the Andean
Agreement but many Andeans argue that multinationals will be
the biggest beneficiaries of the common market. To illustrate this,
one must note that those corporations who meet divestiture requirenments will have access to a tariff free zone consisting of well
over 62 million people.79 It is only natural that with that sized
74. U.S. exports to twenty Latin American republics
out of $38 billion in total exports. Birns and Lounsbury,
vival in Latin America, 6 CoLU.mBI J. WoRL Bus. No.
75. $846 million in Chile; $684 million in Colombia;

were $5 billion
The Art of Sur4, 36, 38 (1971).
$704 million in

Peru; and $220 million in Bolivia and Ecuador. Scbliesser, Restrictions
on Foreign Investment in the Andean Common Market, 5 IxT'L LAWYER
586, 587 at note 4 (1971).
76. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1970, at 77, col. 1.
77. Linowitz, supra note 71, at 125.
78. Behrman, supranote 55, at 68.
79. GRUNEWALD, WIONCZEK, CARPoY, supra note 16, at 59.

market and the entrepreneurship, capital, technology and wealth
of multinationals such corporations stand to be major beneficiaries
within a common market structure. Even though certain rules
regarding allocation of industries may stifle multinational freedom
of expansion, the Agreement "contains a handsome carrot: a guarantee that competing projects won't be set up in other countries of
the bloc." 80
For this reason there have been a number of instances in which
multinationals have shown greater zeal for integration than domestic enterprises. 81 "A dozen complementation agreements to
create preferential or free trade sectors have been negotiated and
another 25 are under consideration . ..

These agreements could

be the basis for regional industrial integration but one of the obstacles to their effective use is felt to be the existence of foreignowned affiliates, which (it is argued) will get the major benefit
from them."8' 2
Thus, there is not only a surprising similarity in the ultimate
goals of the multinational corporation and the Andean Agreement,
but a potential to use the multinational as a vehicle for reaching
the objectives of regional integration. This means that there is
genuine hope that the multinational enterprise can grow within
the context of regional economic integration for the mutual benefit of the corporation and the host country.
One further point must be made regarding the possible divestment of all American investments in Andean nations. Even if
such total divestment should occur, (although it is exceedingly unlikely), it may not prove all that disastrous for the Andean economies. This is because the modern economies of western Europe
and Japan have both the capability and desire to supplant U.S.
investment in Latin America. For U.S. multinationals then, it's
the proverbial situation in which, "if you don't, your competitor
will." In fact, in May of 1973, "AnCom officials contend [ed] that
foreign investment and offers of technology are on the rise."83
It is clear from the preceding analysis that continued investment, while following AnCom regulations, as opposed to total divestment is the more economically appropriate approach for the
modern multinational enterprise. While it is true that multinationals will have to adjust to the new demands of the host coun80. Wall St. J., supra note 32.

81. Notable examples are IBM, Olivetti, and Ford. See Alejandro, supra
note 17, at 339 et. seq.
82. Behrman, supra note 55, at 64.
83. Wall St. J., supra note 32.
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tries, there is nothing inherently hostile towards multinational
goals in the Andean Agreement. "In the final analysis the management of the parent corporation must decide how much shortrun gain it will sacrifice through support of development or eco84
nomic plans which foster growth in the host country.1
IV.

PRoGNosis AND SOYE SUGGESTIONS

It is ironic that "[p] erhaps the most damaging obstacle to the
growth of multinational corporations is that their existence and
success foster the nationalistic reactions that could cause their long
run atrophy." 85 In the preceding sections those nationalistic reactions have been examined in the context of one economic integration model. This model well illustrates that the success and
growth of both economic independence and the multinational corporation depends on a very delicate balance. A balance must be
maintained between the desire for foreign investment and the desire for local independent control over the impact of such investment on the domestic economies. It is contended that such a balance can be maintained.
The acceptance of the hypothesis that multinationals can continue to survive in Latin America in the context of economic integration by no means heralds the demise of friction between economic nationalism and the multinational enterprise. "Conciliation
of conflicting Latin American goals will not be easy, and will frequently lead to inconsistent and hesitant behavior. '8 6 Therefore,
further steps must be taken by both Andean governments and
multinational enterprises to insure a harmonious growth of the
multinational within the parameters of economic integration ef87
forts.
84. Hoskins, The LDC and the MNC: Will They Develop Together?, 6

COLumBIA J. WoRLD Bus. No. 5, 61, 70 (1971).
85. Id., at 66.
86. Alejandro, supranote 17, at 343.

87. Some programs on a broader scale have been proposed. One is the
formation of an international investment code. This would be structured
and would function in much the same way the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now functions. See J. Con MncE AND CoMmIcAL,Feb. 11, 1971, at 4. A proposal has also been made for a Latin American advisory group within the United States. This would consist of experts from a broad range of U.S. institutions. See J. LErmsoN, J. DE
ONiZ, THE ALLIANCE THAT LOST ITS WAY, (Quadrangle Books 1970), at 160-

61.

What is needed above and beyond that which the Agreement has
called for is further coordination of national policies among member nations on price-fixing, taxation, anti-trust, and trading with
the enemy agreements. More specifically some suggestions might
include:
1) The seeking of tariff reductions and other preferences extended by advanced countries to the manufactures of less developed areas. This is desirable not only to stimulate exportation,
but also such preferences would make multinational investment
in Andean nations more attractive since foreign subsidiaries could
also share in expanded exportation of domestically produced manufactures. 88
2) "The Andean countries might do well to continue their law
making efforts by going into fields of regulation of shareholding
fiduciaries, including state stock acquisition agencies and the stock
market itself."8 9 This would lead to greater governmental control
over investments and the economy in general.
3) Perhaps most crucial of all is the stimulation of local entrepreneurship. This can best be realized by persuading local entrepreneurs to leave the traditional field of real estate and move
into industry which in turn should foster a more active domestic
economy while at the same time refining and encouraging local
entrepreneurship. Concurrently, there should be an attempt to
direct new foreign investment into the higher risk ventures, saving
the more stable industries for local companies.
But the onus of change is not only on the host countries. Multinational enterprises must be prepared to alter their posture as well.
"The whole relationship that has grown up between Latin American countries and the United States over the last century must be
modified. ' 0 This will entail a two-pronged approach consisting
of altering not only businessmen's attitudes but U.S. governmental
policy. 1 Corporations, traditionally interested primarily in prof88. See supranote 46.
89. Oliver, supranote 22.
90. GHUNEWALD, WIONCZEK, CARNoY, supra note 16, at 66.
91. A good discussion of why and how the governmental policy must
change is found in Birns, supra note 74. The U.S. has already responded
by establishing the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).
Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, pt. I, tit. IV, Stat. 805 (generally codified in
scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.). "One objective of the Corporation [OPIC]
is to encourage and support only those private investments in less de-

veloped friendly countries which are welcomed by the host country and

are sensitive and responsive to the special needs and requirements of their
economies and which contribute to the social and economic development
of their people. Thus, OPIC will assist projects which are commercially
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its, have not been concerned with local political or cultural ramifications of their policies on the host country. Multinational corporations must now mature to a point where they can "share a
future with the region characterized by needed services, well rendered, reasonable profits, good will, and a dignified and enlightened relationship. '92 Multinationals will have to become good
"corporate citizens" and refrain from viewing Latin American nations merely as sources of cheap labor and raw materials. One author notes that a modification of current business attitudes may
be achieved by, (i) avoiding partisan involvement in local political
matters; (ii) purging the corporate memory of the good old days
when profit margins could run at more than twice the domestic
rate; and (iii) stress exports from the region rather than bringing
93
home-country produced imports into the region.
One final problem is to assure multinationals that their investments will be secure. For, as alluded to earlier, multinationals
would be willing to forego quick profits in return for more security
in their investments. In response to this some investment insurance programs have arisen. Most notable is the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).94 If successful, such investment insurance could greatly enhance the quantity of foreign investment to Latin America.
In conclusion then, economic independence is now too deeply ingrained in Latin American attitudes to be turned back. It thus
seems inevitable that multinational enterprises can look forward
to more regulations over their investments. If such enterprises are
to survive in Andean nations (and all of Latin America as well),
then they must "serve a policy which will deliberately achieve the
harmonious and balanced development of the region." 95 The Anviable, and yield adequate returns to their investors, but which also bene-

fit the host countries in terms of increased national income, higher
levels of employment, improved management and technology, and increased earnings or savings of foreign exchange. Freeman, Recent United
States Policy Toward Private Investment, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 469, 470

(1971).

92. Birns, supra note 74, at 44.
93. Id., at 43.
94. Carter, National Support of Multinational Ventures, 7 CoLunmiA J.

WoRID Bus. No. 5, 6, 8-9 (1972).

95. Multinational Investment in the Economic Development and Inte-

dean Agreement seems a workable model toward achieving such a
modern harmony between the goals of the multinational enterprise and those of the host state. The prognosis is favorable because the Agreement is "not trying to do too much in too little
time."96
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gration of Latin America, b
a-AbmacANw DE
OPmENT BAZx (1968),
at 6.
96. Bolin, How South America is Moving Ahead-with the Andean
Common Market, 9 BusnEss ABnOAD September, 1969, 13, 14.

